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ESSAYS
DISCOURAGING ELECTION CONTESTS
Joshua A. Douglas *
A news article that appeared shortly after the 2012 election on
the National Public Radio website asked, "Why Have There Been
So Many Contested Elections?"1 After the 2000 presidential elec-
tion debacle and Bush v. Gore,2 candidates who lose by a small
margin seem more willing to take the election into overtime and
ask courts to resolve disputes on ballot counting issues or to de-
clare who won. Each election cycle candidates see various errors
that occur in our election system, some of which they believe
could change the outcome in a close race. As a result, preparing
for post-election litigation is now a routine part of campaign
strategy.
3
This is not a positive development. Today's elections are in-
fused with hyperpolarization and election contests only increase
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. J.D., 2007, The
George Washington University Law School; B,A., 2002, The George Washington Universi-
ty. Thanks to Steve Huefner, Mike Pitts, and Michael Solimine for reading a draft of this
essay. I am grateful to Ned Foley and Dan Tokaji for our in-depth conversations about the
ideas in this piece. Thanks also to Gordon Mowen for excellent research assistance.
1. Why Have There Been So Many Contested Elections?, NPR, Nov. 21, 2012, http://
www.npr.orgfblogs/itsallpolitics/2012/11/21/165665600/why-have-there-been-so-many-con
tested-elections.
2. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
3. See Deborah Charles, U.S. Campaigns Prepare for Post-Election Court Fights on
Voting Laws, REUTERS, Sept. 12, 2012, www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/12/usa-campaign
-vote-laws-idUSLIE8kBCO620120912 (noting that "challenging the rules governing elec-
tions has become a key part of any major candidate's political strategy"); Bill Turque, Elec-
tion Lawyers Ready to Challenge Alleged Illegal Voting Activity, WASH. POST, Oct. 29,
2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-29/politics/35500652__election-results-
elected-votes-popular-vote (explaining that "[e]lection litigation has become an institu-
tionalized part of campaigns since the 2000 presidential race").
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that partisanship.! As campaigns have become more partisan,
candidates continue to ask courts to decide election disputes.
When elections are razor thin, partisan discourse becomes even
more acute. Elections that go into overtime, when the winner is
unclear and a court is asked to step in, pose the greatest risk of
suffering from the taint--or at least the appearance--of ideology
infusing a judicial decision, especially because judges are not im-
mune from ideological decision making.5
Much of today's judicial polarization surrounding election cases
and the rise of election-related litigation is traceable to a single
United States Supreme Court decision: Bush v. Gore.' That case,
which effectively decided the 2000 Presidential election, signaled
that courts were open for business for election-related claims.
Candidates heeded the message; as Professor Rick Hasen demon-
strates, the sheer amount of election litigation has increased
dramatically in the last decade.7
The most high-profile cases, of course, are those that come after
Election Day and in effect decide who wins a high-level office. In
the years following Bush v. Gore, courts or other tribunals re-
solved election contests involving, among others, the Washington
gubernatorial election in 2004,8 a 2006 congressional election in
Florida,9 Minnesota's U.S. Senate election in 2008,1" and Alaska's
4. See Ethan Bronner, Partisan Rifts Hinder Efforts to Improve U.S. Voting System,
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/01/us/voting-systems-plagues-
go-far-beyond-identification.html (describing the increasing amount of partisanship in
crafting rules for our elections).
5. See Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 993 (2005) ("A
court asked to decide a question of statutory or constitutional law that affects the outcome
of an already held election is injected in the worst way into the political thicket. Journal-
ists immediately question the partisan background of the judges, and partisan motives are
immediately questioned and dissected no matter what the judges do.").
6. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
7. See Hasen, supra note 5, at 957-58; Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court's
Shrinking Election Law Docket, 2001-2010: A Legacy of Bush v. Gore or Fear of the Rob-
erts Court?, 10 ELECTION L.J. 325, 327 (2011); Richard L. Hasen, The 2012 Voting Wars,
Judicial Backstops, and the Resurrection of Bush v. Gore, __ GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2013).
8. See In re Coday, 130 P.3d 809 (Wash. 2006).
9. See Jennings v. Elections Canvassing Comm'n, No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL
4404531 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 21, 2006); see also Jessica Ring Amunson & Sam Hirsch, The
Case of the Disappearing Votes: Lessons from the Jennings v. Buchanan Congressional
Election Contest, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 397 (2008).
10. See In re Contest of Gen. Election, 767 N.W.2d 453 (Minn. 2009) (per curiam).
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U.S. Senate election in 2010.11 Importantly, however, none of
these post-election disputes resulted in a change of the certified
winner. In fact, there have been no successful election contests for
federal office (either House of Congress or President) or governor
in recent memory.12
In a previous article, I outlined the various procedural mecha-
nisms available in all fifty states through which candidates may
contest an election." An "election contest," which is subsequent to
an administrative recount, is an adjudicatory procedure that oc-
curs after the election officials certify a winner. 4 States have
widely differing and highly detailed procedures for losing candi-
dates to challenge the certified result.15 I also suggested the crea-
tion of a fairer mechanism to achieve impartiality in determining
who decides these disputes."
But having a better process for resolving the election contests
that inevitably will arise does not go to the heart of the problem:
candidates using courts or other tribunals to place elections into
overtime after the state certifies someone as the winner. That is,
creating a better procedural mechanism for election contests is
helpful when an election must go to the courts after Election Day,
but it does not address how to limit unmeritorious post-election
litigation. And yet, if the last decade is any indication, most elec-
tion contests are unsuccessful-at least for federal and statewide
offices. 7
This essay offers a few proposals for discouraging losing candi-
dates from contesting the certified result of an election. The ulti-
mate goal in any election, of course, is to ensure that a state de-
ll. See Miller v. Treadwell, 245 P.3d 867 (Alaska 2010).
12. See L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONTESTED ELECTION CASES IN
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1-2 (2010), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/
98-194_20101102.pdf (noting that challengers in U.S. House election contests rarely suc-
ceed); Senate Procedures in Contested Elections, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/art
andhistory/history/commoncontested-elections/procedures-contested-elections.htm (last
visited Feb. 18, 2013). Although I have not conducted a thorough empirical analysis, my
reading of recent election contest cases suggests that victories for those challenging the
certified results are few and far between, especially in high-profile cases for higher offices.
See, e.g., Contested Senate Elections, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/
history/commoncontestedelections/intro.htm.
13. Joshua A. Douglas, Procedural Fairness in Election Contests, 88 IND. L.J. 1 (2013).
14. Id. at 4. The focus of this essay is on election contests themselves.
15. See id. at 5-34.
16. Id. at 44-56.
17. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
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clares as the winner the person who actually received the most
votes. But when an election is close, a candidate on the losing side
might see an incentive to continue the fight in the courts on the
off-chance that it would change the outcome. The candidate could
challenge, for example, certain provisional or absentee ballots-
even if the likelihood that the candidate will win is slim (but still
theoretically present). This type of contest has the potential to
damage the integrity and perceived legitimacy of both the election
system and the ultimate winner. 8 What can we do procedurally to
counteract this incentive?
I suggest three initial proposals, ranging from the boldest-an
outright ban on election contests-to more modest hurdles for
candidates who wish to pursue a post-election challenge. First,
recognizing the importance of finality, we could simply dictate
that the certification of the winner is final and that there is no
way to contest the election further. Second, we could raise filing
fees for initiating an election contest or force the losing party to
pay the victor's costs and attorney's fees, such as by requiring the
posting of a bond. Finally, we could create a public stigma of sorts
for "sore loser" candidates by restricting their future ballot access
or giving these candidates a disfavored ballot placement in a sub-
sequent elections. Or we could impose a requirement that the
candidate's advertisements in the next election include a dis-
claimer-along with approving the message-that the candidate
unsuccessfully litigated a post-election dispute in a previous elec-
tion. To start, we could introduce these disincentives for federal
and statewide elections, which would limit election contests that
affect the most people, are the highest-profile, and have the least
chance of success. 9 States could then decide whether to expand
these rules to all elections.
The purpose of this essay is to foster a conversation of how to
limit post-election litigation, with these three broad ideas provid-
ing a starting place for the discussion. There are, of course, hur-
dles to any reforms; some of these proposals might even raise
constitutional concerns. But the unfortunate reality is that pre-
paring for post-election lawsuits has become normal operating
18. See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily, Foreword: The Legacy of Bush v. Gore in Public Opin-
ion and American Law, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 325, 326 (2011) (noting that Bush v. Gore
remains a "charged" decision for many people).
19. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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procedure for campaigns. By thinking of creative ways to discour-
age the filing of election contests that have little chance of suc-
cess, we can limit the uncertainty, turmoil, and partisanship that
accompanies the judicial resolution of an election.
This essay proceeds in three sections. Section I lays the founda-
tion for why our system encourages-or at least does not dis-
suade-the filing of post-election contests in close races. Section
II posits that election contests are often bad for our democracy,
explaining why post-election litigation might harm the ideals of
finality, certainty, and legitimacy in the election process. Section
III sets out three structural reforms that might make losing can-
didates think twice before initiating an election contest. Ultimate-
ly, the goal of this essay is to promote a broader discussion of the
propriety of post-election litigation and what we can do to curtail
it.
I. STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF OUR ELECTION SYSTEM
ENCOURAGE POST-ELECTION CONTESTS
Losing candidates in any close race must consider whether they
should use a post-election procedure to contest the certified re-
sult, such as litigation. There are several features of election me-
chanics that promote this strategy.
First, American elections are simply more polarized than they
have been in years.0 The stakes seem higher with each successive
election, especially on the national stage. The political parties do
not work together as easily as they once did.21 The electorate is
fairly evenly split.22 Therefore, winning has become perhaps even
more important than it used to be. Add to that the media satura-
tion and increased "horse race" coverage of campaigns-especially
20. See Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolar-
ized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 275-81 (2011).
21. See generally Alan Abramowitz & Kyle L. Sanders, Why Can't We All Just Get
Along? The Reality of a Polarized America 9 (THE FORUM, Manuscript No. 1076, 2005),
available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/-govt/docs/Abramowitz.pdf ("Differences between
Democratic and Republican [citizens] on a wide range of issues have increased substan-
tially over the past three decades.").
22. See MORRIS P. FIORINA, ET AL., CULTURE WAR? THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED
AMERICA 12-15 (2d ed. 2006).
2013] 1019
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in the age of social media 2"-and it is no wonder candidates and
political parties fight to the bitter end in a close election.1
4
Second, election administrators-who are often partisan them-
selves-have a lot of discretion in how to run an election. They
must make on-the-ground decisions about whether to allow cer-
tain voters to cast a ballot, whether a ballot indicates a clear vote
for a candidate, and whether to count certain provisional or ab-
sentee ballots. With this robust discretion comes the opportunity
for errors in the vote casting and counting process. Accordingly,
there is more opportunity for a candidate in a close election to
challenge the result based on the way local election officials ad-
ministered the election. Administrators' vote counting determina-
tions have been the main basis of recent election contests. For in-
stance, in Washington State in the 2004 gubernatorial election,
supporters of Republican Dino Rossi challenged the inclusion of
certain absentee ballots in the count.25 In Minnesota in 2008, the
dispute over the U.S. Senate election was also about local admin-
istrators' handling of absentee ballots.26 And the 2010 election
contest for Alaska's U.S. Senate seat involved local election ad-
ministrators' decision to count write-in ballots that had mis-
spelled candidate Lisa Murkowski's name.2 7
Some of this added discretion-and the corresponding in-
creased ability of a candidate to find a basis for a post-election
challenge-is an unintended consequence of reforms that are
supposed to protect voters' rights. The Help America Vote Act of
2002 mandates that states allow voters who show up to the polls,
but who are not listed in the poll books, to cast a provisional bal-
lot.28 But the statute is silent on whether the states must count
those provisional ballots. Further, whether someone may cast a
regular ballot or must instead vote provisionally can be a matter
23. See Richard L. Hasen, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT
ELECTION MELTDOWN 193 (Yale Univ. Press, 2012).
24. See Richard L. Hasen, How Many More Near-Election Disasters Before Congress
Wakes Up?, THE DAILY BEAST, Oct. 30, 2012, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/
10/30/how-many-more-near-election-disasters-before-congress-wakes-up.html (' Those on
the losing end of a close election are more likely than they were before 2000 to demand a
recount and go to postelection litigation.").
25. In re Coday, 130 P.3d 809, 812 (Wash. 2006).
26. In re Contest of Gen. Election, 767 N.W. 2d 453, 458 (Minn. 2009) (per curiam).
27. Miller v. Treadwell, 245 P.3d 867, 869 (Alaska 2010).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 15482(a) (2006).
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of poll worker discretion amidst confusing standards.29 Whether
the voter complied precisely with all requirements of filling out
the provisional ballot envelope entails a fact-specific inquiry. Not
surprisingly, these provisional ballots become the main point of
contention in a close election."
Similarly, courts or other tribunals have little guidance on how
to resolve the dispute, meaning that they often have great discre-
tion. A candidate who is behind in the vote count thus loses little
by filing an election contest. For example, in most jurisdictions,
statutory guidance or judicial precedent allow a court to void an
election when the errors "are 'so pervasive as to undermine the
integrity of the vote,"' but fail to say what circumstances meet
that standard." Although election contests do not often succeed,
that fact alone will probably not stop a losing candidate from
bringing a challenge on the off-chance that a court will exercise
its discretion and vacate the certified result. To be sure, there
might be political reasons for not contesting an election, especial-
ly if the candidate plans to run again in future years.32 But the
lack of guidance on the types of electoral errors that should lead
to a reversal of the certified result leaves the courthouse door
open to candidates who lost by only a few votes, as there is al-
ways a chance that a sympathetic judge might overturn the out-
come. So long as there are few meaningful constraints on judges'
discretion in deciding post-election disputes, losing candidates in
close races will continue to initiate election contests-unless
there are other structural impediments to post-election litigation.
States have not formulated clear pleading or evidentiary
standards for election contests. Some states stipulate the appro-
priate standard of review of a lower tribunal's findings of fact in
post-election litigation.33 But few states constrain judges in any
29. See, e.g., Joshua Douglas, One Voter's Tale Tells It All, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER,
Nov. 12, 2012, at All (recounting the story of one voter who was not initially offered a
provisional ballot even though he was entitled to one).
30. See, e.g., Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 245 (6th Cir.
2011).
31. Edward B. Foley, The Analysis and Mitigation of Electoral Errors, 18 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 350, 371 (citing Andrews v. Powell, 848 N.E.2d 243, 252 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)).
32. See Edward B. Foley, The Founders' Bush v. Gore: The 1792 Election Dispute and
Its Continuing Relevance, 44 IND. L. REV. 23, 61 (2010) ("Richard Nixon refused to chal-
lenge John F. Kennedy's victory in 1960 for fear of being labeled a sore loser, and he won
the 1968 presidential election.").
33. See BARRY H. WEINBERG, THE RESOLUTION OF ELECTION DISPUTES: LEGAL
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meaningful way.14 Only a handful of states delineate the proper
evidentiary burden on those challenging a contest.35 In regular
civil litigation the new heightened pleading standard from Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 5 and Ashcroft v. Iqba3 7 in theory poses
a procedural hurdle for some plaintiffs, who may choose not to in-
itiate a case because they fear they cannot meet the court's plau-
sibility standard. It is not clear, however, that these Supreme
Court decisions apply well in the election setting, especially for a
post-election dispute." Moreover, there appears to be little, if any,
enforcement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 or its state
counterparts in election cases that might preclude the filing of
even frivolous election contests.3 ' That is, there is little in the way
of procedural mechanisms that might make a losing candidate
choose not to initiate an election contest if the result is close, even
if it is unlikely to change in litigation.
Third, the process of contesting an election is not that onerous.
Many states treat election contests like regular civil litigation. °
PRINCIPLES THAT CONTROL ELECTION CHALLENGES 121 (2d ed. 2008); see, e.g., LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 18:1409() (2012) (providing that in an election contest "a court, upon its own
motion, may correct manifest error to which its attention is called").
34. See Steven F. Huefner, Remedying Election Wrongs, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 265,
287 (2007) ("Given the preceding range of available remedies, most states' existing election
contest statutes do little to constrain a court's choice when some election irregularity is
proven."); see also id. at 296 (noting that limiting judicial discretion in election contests
also helps to promote separation of powers because it removes a court from the political
process as much as possible).
35. Cf. ALA. CODE § 17-16-41 (2006) (providing that a court should not overturn the
result, even if misconduct occurred, if that misconduct would not alter the outcome of the
election); WASH. REV. CODE. § 29A.68.110 (2005) (same).
36. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
37. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
38. See Joshua A. Douglas, Election Law Pleading, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2013).
39. See FED. R. CIV. PRO. 11. A search for cases invoking Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 11 or its state counterparts and election issues produced few relevant hits. In one
case involving an election contest, the Indiana Supreme Court determined that the contes-
tee had sufficiently verified her complaint to allow her contest to move forward under the
state's counterpart to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. See Austin v. Sanders, 492
N.E.2d 8, 9-10 (Ind. 1986). The Mississippi Supreme Court denied sanctions regarding a
mayoral election contest after finding that the suit was not frivolous. See Stringer v. Lu-
cas, 608 So.2d 1351, 1359 (Miss. 1992). In a more recent case, a Utah appeals court re-
versed the imposition of sanctions in a contest involving a municipal election due to the
party's failure to comply with the strict procedural requirements of the state's Rule 11. See
Barnard v. Mansell, 221 P.3d 874, 875-77 (Utah Ct. App. 2009).
40. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-2013 (2012) (stating that election contests "shall
be held according to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure so far as practicable"); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 19:29-5 (West 2012) ('The proceedings shall be similar to those in a civil action so
far as practicable, but shall be under the control and direction of the court ....").
1022 [Vol. 47:1015
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Accordingly, the filing fees are the same as in any other case. For
instance, to contest the result in Florida during the 2000 presi-
dential election, Al Gore simply filed a regular election contest
lawsuit in Leon County, which cost him, under the governing
statute at the time, at most $210.4" Even when states have differ-
ent procedures for election contests, the barrier to entry is usually
quite minimal. A few states require those contesting an election
to post a bond to cover the costs of the contest, but these costs are
typically small and do not pose much of a deterrent.42
What is needed is a thumb on the scale to discourage candi-
dates from continuing the fight when there is little chance of suc-
cess. Of course, the ultimate goal is accuracy: the candidate who
received the most votes should be declared the winner. But elec-
tion contests rarely change the certified result.43 The state's ini-
tial declaration and certification of the winner usually carries the
day. That fact, however, has not stopped losing candidates from
pursuing post-election remedies. Although the way we run our
elections might open the door to post-election litigation, the reali-
ty that election contests rarely succeed--combined with the nega-
tive aspects of election contests discussed below-counsel toward
41. See Gore v. Harris, No. 00-2808, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2000) (un-
published) (subsequent appellate history omitted); see also FLA. STAT. § 28.241(1) (1998).
42. See infra notes 73-88 and accompanying text.
43. The only recent post-election litigation that actually changed the outcome was not
an "election contest" per se, because the county did not certify a winner until after the liti-
gation concluded. See Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 245 (6th
Cir. 2011) (ruling that the county must count certain provisional ballots, which when
counted resulted in a change in the candidate who received the most votes). This raises
the question of whether, in addition to discouraging election contests, we should limit
post-Election Day pre-certification litigation. This essay focuses on post-certification elec-
tion contests because every state has specific statutory procedures in place for challenging
the certified winner of an election, meaning there is a losing candidate who is invoking the
state's processes to continue the fight. See Douglas, supra note 13, at 58-81. That is, "elec-
tion contests" are a defined category of post-election litigation in which a candidate who is
not declared the winner still challenges the result. Id.
Focusing on discouraging adjudicatory election contests does not preclude administra-
tive recounts, during which the state has not yet officially declared one candidate the win-
ner. Recounts also are more likely to change the vote totals. See, e.g., In re Contest of Gen.
Election, 767 N.W.2d 453, 457 (Minn. 2009) (per curiam) (noting that the statewide re-
count changed the result from Coleman ahead by 206 votes to Franken winning by 225
votes). Limiting all post-election pre-certification litigation presents a more vexing line-
drawing problem. But it might make sense to impose the same hurdles on post-Election
Day pre-certification "adjudicatory-type" litigation, such as the Hunter case. See Daniel H.
Lowenstein, The Meaning of Bush v. Gore, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1007, 1017 (2007); see also
Edward B. Foley, Refining the Bush v. Gore Taxonomy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1035, 1037 (2007)
(responding to Lowenstein and distinguishing "adjudicatory-type" actions from "regulato-
ry-type" actions).
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making it a little harder for a losing candidate to continue the
election in a post-certification lawsuit.
II. WHY ELECTION CONTESTS MAY BE BAD FOR OUR SYSTEM
Drawn out election disputes hurt the smooth running of our
democracy. The system craves finality, particularly on election
night. In this day of increased social media, campaigns and elec-
tions move at ultra-fast speed." For better or worse, Americans
have become accustomed to instant, or at least near-instant, re-
sults. When the electorate does not know which candidate won an
election, it becomes weary of the political process. If it is a high-
profile election, the public knows that lawyers will swoop in and
the courts will be called upon to decide the result. An election
that is "too close to call" raises heightened awareness and exposes
the various flaws in the system. Of course, that might be a good
thing if we correct bad election processes; for instance, almost all
jurisdictions have modernized their voting equipment based on
the problems stemming from Bush v. Gore.4" But election contests
become problematic when political actors exploit these flaws for
their own political gain.
Election contests also can negatively affect the legitimacy of
the ultimate winner." Even long after the 2000 presidential elec-
tion, many people still believe that the Supreme Court unfairly
decided Bush v. Gore, which resulted in George W. Bush becom-
ing President. 7 A contested election undermines the notion that
the winner has an electoral mandate. Although any close election
might suggest that the winner's legitimacy is quite thin, this sen-
44. See Jessica Gwynn & Dawn C. Chmielewski, Election 2012; Social Media Conver-
sations the Real Show, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at AA3; Bianca Bosker, One Election
Night Seen 31 Million Ways, Thanks to Social Media, HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 7, 2012,
http://www.huffingtonpost.combianca-bosker/social-media-election-nightb-209021 1.html.
45. See MARTHA KROPF AND DAVID C. KIMBALL, HELPING AMERICA VOTE: THE LIMITS
OF ELECTION REFORM 25-26 (2012) (outlining how the Help America Vote Act encouraged
changes in voting equipment).
46. See Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1, 37
(2007) ('When courts get involved in election disputes... they run a risk of undermining
the public's faith in the electoral process and in the fairness of the courts."); Huefner, su-
pra note 34, at 293 (noting that "it is important that representatives serve with full au-
thority and respect, rather than with unresolved questions about their legitimacy").
47. See, e.g., Persily, supra note 18, at 326 (reporting that in a telephone survey ten
years after Bush v. Gore about one-third of respondents believe the Court decided the case
fairly while about one-third of respondents think the Court did not decide the case fairly).
1024 [Vol. 47:1015
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timent becomes heightened when an election goes beyond Elec-
tion Day into overtime in the courts.
Moreover, post-election contests-at least for federal and
statewide offices-rarely succeed." States spend a lot of money
and resources shepherding an election contest through the judi-
cial system, with very little payoff most of the time. States must
devote judges and their litigation structures to hear the case in a
timely fashion, meaning that other cases on the docket must
wait.49 Including Bush v. Gore, since 2000 several high-profile
post-election disputes have ended in the courts;" only one,
Hunter, changed the result, and that was not even an election
contest but a pre-certification challenge over the counting of pro-
visional ballots.5' That is, once the state certifies the result (often
after an administrative recount), there is only a very small
chance that a court or other tribunal will declare the losing can-
didate the winner. This makes sense: courts usually will not want
to reverse the outcome of a final, certified count for fear of being
seen as thwarting the will of the people. Even in the Hunter case,
which did change the outcome, the court did not declare the chal-
lenging candidate the winner. The court instead required the
counting of certain sealed provisional ballots, and those ballots
tipped the vote count to Hunter.52
Recounts are more likely to change the initial outcome of the
election in a close race.53 But once there is a certified result, elec-
tion contests usually do not alter who won. This does not mean,
however, that candidates will not try; the lack of success for pre-
vious losing candidates has not seemed to provide much of a de-
terrent effect, as we continue to see post-election litigation. This
suggests that the system should discourage election contests un-
less there is a strong chance that the losing candidate will ulti-
48. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
49. Many states require a court to place an election contest at the top of its docket. See
Douglas, supra note 13, at 34-36.
50. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
51. See Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 222, 245 (6th Cir.
2011).
52. See Dan Horn, Longest Election in County History Finally Decided, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, May 18, 2012, http://news.cincinnati.com/article/20120517/NEWS0106/305
170102JLongest-election-county-history-finally-decided.
53. See, e.g., In re Contest of Gen. Election, 767 N.W. 2d 453, 457 (Minn. 2009) (per
curiam) (noting that the statewide recount changed the result from Coleman ahead by 206
votes to Franken winning by 225 votes).
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mately prevail. The focus should be on eliminating post-election
litigation that is, more likely than not, going to fail-which, as
the past decade demonstrates, has included all federal and
statewide election contests. 4 If more election contests succeed,
then it will be apparent that post-election litigation is serving the
valuable role of providing a fail-safe mechanism to correct elec-
tion irregularities or ward off partisan manipulation of the vote
casting and counting process. But the fact that hardly any recent
election contests have changed the result suggests that too many
candidates are unnecessarily bringing their campaigns to the
courts. We should minimize election contests that have a very
small chance of success because they clog up the system, thwart
finality, and produce little benefit.
Finally, drawn-out election disputes harm citizens' ability to
have continued representation as the contest plays out. For ex-
ample, the citizens of Minnesota suffered from having only one
U.S. Senator for almost six months until the Minnesota Supreme
Court finally decided the case in favor of Al Franken, prompting
Norm Coleman to concede.5 The Hamilton County judiciary
might have been short one Juvenile Court Judge for a year-and-a-
half during the Hunter litigation had another judge not stepped
in to fill the seat temporarily.6 We must try to avoid situations in
which citizens have less than full representation because an elec-
tion remains unresolved. The purpose of electing representatives
is to have them serve in public positions, and that service should
start when their terms are set to begin. As discussed below, Mich-
igan and New York do not allow any vacancy during the pendency
of an election contest: those states do not have specific statutory
54. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
55. See Monica Davey, Sole Minnesota Senator Has Problems Built for 2, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 8, 2009, at A20; P.J. Huffstutter & James Oliphant, Franken Win Alters Power Equa-
tion, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 2009, at Al.
56. A retired judge filled the seat until the case was resolved. See Kimball Perry, Ju-
venile Court Sees Exits, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 17, 2011, at Al. There are two judi-
cial positions in the Hamilton County Juvenile Court, and when the other juvenile court
judge resigned in November 2011, the Ohio Governor appointed one of the candidates from
the 2010 election, John Williams, to that seat to serve alongside the retired judge who was
filling in during the pendency of the Hunter litigation. Had Williams ultimately won the
Hunter contest, he would have replaced the retired judge and assumed the position in dis-
pute, leaving another vacancy. See Kimball Perry, Ruling: Williams Sits Above Hunter,
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 10, 2012, at Ci; Kimball Perry, Williams Expected to Become
Juvenile Court Judge, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 19, 2011, at Al. Hunter ultimately pre-
vailed in the post-election litigation over the 2010 election, however, so she and Williams
are now the duly elected judges on that court.
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guidance for contesting an election, instead permitting quo war-
ranto actions that seek to oust an officeholder who has "usurped"
an office.17 This means that there will always be someone in office
during an election challenge, as the very nature of a quo warranto
case is that a current officeholder is improperly serving because,
for example, of problems in the election that gave the person the
position. But for all other states, there remains the possibility of a
vacancy while the election contest proceeds.58 We should discour-
age the filing of post-election disputes unless there is a genuine
question about who won and the outcome is very likely to change.
Otherwise, a candidate might too easily continue the election in
the courts, thereby depriving the jurisdiction's citizens of repre-
sentation as the case is decided. This is a negative consequence of
an election contest that is not worth the benefit of prolonged elec-
tion litigation.
III. IDEAS FOR DISINCENTIVIZING POST-ELECTION LITIGATION
The current system is set up to welcome, or at least not dis-
courage, the filing of a post-election challenge. Drawn out elec-
tions, when the winner is unknown for weeks or months after
Election Day, are bad for the electoral process-especially, as
noted above, because they usually do not succeed. This fact, how-
ever, has not stopped candidates from trying. Accordingly, proce-
dural or structural mechanisms are necessary to counterbalance
the ease and incentives of filing an election contest. This section
suggests three such reforms. Because post-recount adjudication
hardly ever changes the result, we should consider mechanisms
to discourage candidates or their supporters from filing an elec-
tion contest except in the most limited of circumstances-when
they actually have a good chance of prevailing. But perhaps more
importantly, the goal of this essay is to start a conversation of
how we can appropriately limit unmeritorious post-election law-
suits. That is, these ideas are just that-ideas to spur a closer in-
quiry into ways to curtail elections from going into overtime.
57. See Douglas, supra note 13, at 10-11.
58. A vacancy, however, is not the inevitable result of an election contest: Christine
Gregoire began serving as Washington State Governor even as Dino Rossi and his sup-
porters initiated an election contest. See David Postman, Susan Gilmore, & Keith Ervin,
GOP Suit Doesn't Ask to Prevent Swearing-in, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 8, 2005, at Al.
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A. Banning All Election Contests
The simplest idea is to preclude a losing candidate from initiat-
ing any post-election litigation.59 If election contests are bad for
our democratic system, then why allow them in the first place? A
state could have a rule that a candidate may not bring any litiga-
tion whatsoever about the counting of ballots or after the certifi-
cation of the result.
Two states, Michigan and New York, effectively preclude elec-
tion contests. ° Instead, they allow only for quo warranto actions,
which are suits against the officeholder for "usurping' the office.61
The certified winner thus assumes the elected position, but a los-
ing candidate can petition the attorney general to bring a quo
warranto suit against the official.62 The benefit of this structure is
that there is always someone in office. In addition, at least in
New York, the attorney general has the sole discretion as to
whether to initiate the quo warranto suit, thereby limiting post-
election litigation to the most extreme cases in which a third par-
ty believes there is a reason to question the winner's election.63
Further, if the quo warranto action is successful and the official is
ousted from office, that person must pay a $2000 fine.64
Thus, the best solution to the problem of post-election litigation
may be to eliminate it entirely. Election contests place the winner
in doubt, sometimes leaving citizens without representation.
They also cost the state money and resources in exchange for lit-
tle tangible benefit. Of course, election contests may reveal flaws
in our election system, but this is possible even without post-
election litigation when scholars and others study previous elec-
tions. Finality is important to elections, and perhaps it makes
59. Some states channel election contests for certain races to the legislature, thereby
prohibiting the judiciary from hearing these post-election disputes. See Douglas, supra
note 13, at 5-8, 12-17. Although this eliminates the possibility of judicial involvement in
an election contest, it still comes with the same problems of a drawn-out affair that pre-
cludes finality in the result. Moreover, a candidate deciding whether to initiate an election
contest in the legislature might have other considerations, such as the political ramifica-
tions of pursuing the case.
60. See Douglas, supra note 13, at 10-11.
61. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.4501 (2000); N.Y. Exec. Law § 63-b (McKinney 2010).
62. MICH. CoMP. LAws § 600.4501; N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 63-b.
63. See, e.g., Delgado v. Sunderland, 767 N.E.2d 662, 665 (N.Y. 2002) (per curiam).
64. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 600.4515; N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63-b(2).
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sense simply to move on once the state's electoral mechanism has
certified a candidate as the winner.
But accuracy is also important. Part of an elected official's le-
gitimacy stems from the belief that the winning candidate re-
ceived the most votes. 5 Perhaps, then, we need to leave the door
just slightly open for election contests to ensure there is a way to
dispute an election if something does go wrong. Moreover, every
state besides Michigan and New York has detailed provisions on
how to contest an election.6" Therefore, it may be better to
acknowledge the reality of election contests and instead impose
hurdles on losing candidates who wish to invoke these processes
unless the candidate truly believes the election contest will suc-
ceed.
B. Monetary Hurdles: Imposing a High Filing Fee or Shifting
Costs and Attorney's Fees
Assuming we are not going to ban election contests entirely,
perhaps there are mechanisms to discourage them except when
absolutely necessary. One idea is to demand a high filing fee for
those who wish to contest an election. A willingness to pay a hefty
sum can serve as a proxy that a candidate or his or her support-
ers actually believe the certified winner did not receive the most
votes because of some election irregularity. Most states do not re-
quire anything of those contesting an election beyond the typical
filing fee for a civil case. Republican Dino Rossi's supporters
spent $110 as a filing fee to contest the Washington gubernatorial
election in 2004.67 To initiate the election contest for U.S. Senate
in 2008, Norm Coleman and his co-plaintiff (a voter) had to pay
only $305 to the Minnesota District Court as the regular adminis-
trative filing fee for civil cases.68 Coleman spent a total of $1,185
in court costs and his co-plaintiff spent a total of $630 to contest
65. See Douglas, supra note 13, at 44-46 (discussing goals for resolving disputed elec-
tions, including "correctly and accurately determining the winner"); Huefner, supra note
34, at 288 (listing several values that an election system should reflect when remedying an
election irregularity).
66. See Douglas, supra note 13, at 58-81 (listing each state's procedures).
67. Docket Entry, Borders v. King Cnty., No. 05-2-00027-3 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2005);
WASH. REV. CODE § 36.18.020(2)(c) (2005) (setting the filing fee at $110).
68. See Register of Actions, In re Contest of Gen. Election, No. 62-cv-09-56 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. 2009). Coleman and his co-plaintiffs avoided paying an additional $305 in fees by
filing jointly. Id.
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the election. 9 Similarly, Joe Miller was required to pay merely
$150 as a filing fee for a civil action in the Alaska Superior Court
to contest the 2010 election of Lisa Murkowski for the U.S. Sen-
ate.7" Tracie Hunter went to federal court to object to the Hamil-
ton County Board of Election's decision not to count certain provi-
sional ballots in her Juvenile Court Judge race, costing her a
$350 filing fee."
What if filing fees for election contests were higher, so that
candidates had to stop and decide whether pursuing the contest
was worth the monetary cost? A filing fee of $350 is paltry and
provides almost no barrier to entry for a candidate or his or her
supporters who may want to continue the fight, even if the out-
come is unlikely to change. A higher filing fee (tens of thousands
of dollars, for example) presents a much more painful hurdle,
which should dissuade some candidates unless there is a fairly
decent chance of success. A much higher monetary barrier could
have, for example, dissuaded Joe Miller from continuing to chal-
lenge Lisa Murkowski's election. Or at least he would have had to
clear an additional hurdle, requiring him to think carefully about
whether litigation was worth it. There would be a little more
"skin in the game."
Of course, a wealthy candidate in a significant campaign might
see no barrier from a high filing fee, or the political party may
step in to pay the candidate's expenses. In addition, the real price
of an election contest comes from attorney's fees, not court costs.
But a state that seeks to elevate the goal of finality in elections
might choose to impose a high filing fee outright on a candidate
who is down after the final canvass and recount of the votes but
still wants to contest the election. At a minimum, there should be
some barrier to entry that is more significant than a nominal fil-
ing fee.
Suppose there is weariness, however, of forcing losing candi-
dates or their supporters to shell out a large filing fee ahead of
time, as that may deter too many valid election contests, especial-
ly for less wealthy individuals. Another idea is to impose a fee on
69. Id. Franken, too, spent $1185 in filing fees to the district court in defending
against the election contest. Id.
70. See Alaska R. Admin. Rule 9.1(b).
71. Docket at 1, Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, Case No. 1:10-CV820 (S.D.
Ohio 2010).
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the back-end for candidates who unsuccessfully challenge the
election's result in post-election litigation. This fee could compen-
sate the state for its costs, pay for the other side's attorney's fees,
or even be penal in nature for dragging out the election. For ex-
ample, some states require a party seeking a recount to cover the
costs of the recount should the result not change. 2 Why not im-
pose a similar cost to a party contesting an election even after a
recount?
Currently, a few states require a plaintiff in a post-election
dispute to post a bond to contest the election, but the practice is
not widespread. For example, in Iowa, a candidate who wishes to
contest an election for the state's presidential electors or for the
U.S. House of Representatives or U.S. Senate must file a bond "in
such amount as shall be set by the presiding judge of the court,
conditional to pay all costs in case the election be confirmed or the
contest dismissed."73 There is no guidance, however, on how high
the bond should be to pay the opposing side's costs. Similarly,
Colorado requires the contesting party to file a bond, with sure-
ties, that runs to the winning candidate that will cover "all costs"
of the contest.74 It is unlikely that a court would set the bond at a
level that would actually deter the filing of a case with a slim
chance of success. In a case from Ohio, for example, the county
clerk set the bond for an election contest for city council at $100,
which the clerk determined was "adequate and in full compliance
with the statutory requirements" that the bond must be a "sum
sufficient ... to pay all the costs of the contest." 5 The Ohio Su-
preme Court did not question this conclusion, finding the bond to
be in "substantial compliance" with the statute.16 Other states
place the bond at a fairly low level, such as $500. Posting a bond
with a surety may not be a strict prerequisite to filing an election
contest even in those states that have a bond requirement. New
72. See, e.g., In re Coday, 130 P.3d 809, 811 (Wash. 2006) (explaining that a Demo-
cratic representative initially sought a recount of the 2004 gubernatorial election and de-
posited $730,000-the amount required under the then-applicable statute-to cover the
cost of the recount should the result come out the same in favor of Republican Dino Rossi).
73. IOWA CODE § 60.7 (2012).
74. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-11-205 (2012); see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-2008 (2008)
(requiring a bond to cover costs in the event the contest fails); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3515.09 (West 2012) (same); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3459 (1978) (same);
75. See Taft v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 854 N.E.2d 472, 475-76 (Ohio
2006) (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.09).
76. Id. at 476.
77. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:29-2 (West 2012).
2013] 1031
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Jersey, for example, explicitly states that "[n]o petition heretofore
filed pursuant to this section shall be dismissed or the prosecu-
tion fail because the petitioner shall not have filed a bond with
sureties as required herein."" Instead, the contesting party can
file the bond without sureties, along with a cash deposit of $500
as security. 9
Some states require a bond only for the inspection of ballots
prior to trial, not for the overall election contest.8 Although this
may protect the disputed ballots or machines, it does not deter
the contest itself. Another approach is to require a bond if the
party that lost before the initial trial court wants to appeal, which
must cover the appellee's costs should the appeal fail.81 This, of
course, deters further appeals, but it does nothing to limit the fil-
ing of the initial action. Moreover, the amount of the bond is often
quite low. Minnesota, for example, requires a bond of only $500 to
appeal a lower court's decision on an election contest.
2
Virginia's bond requirement appears to be the most stringent
and actually could deter unmeritorious post-election litigation: a
challenging party must file a bond with surety set at $100 per
precinct in the contested district for a legislative election and $10
per precinct for a gubernatorial election.83 Virginia had 2,588 pre-
cincts in 2012, meaning that a losing candidate who wants to con-
test a statewide election must post a bond with surety of over
$25,000, which the party forfeits if he or she loses the contest.
8 4
This might provide some deterrent to the filing of a post-election
challenge that the contesting party realizes is a long shot-which
includes most election contests. Curiously, however, Virginia's
statutes do not impose the same bond requirement on contests
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-677 (1980); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/23-
1.6a (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1447 (2010); MINN. STAT. § 209.06 (2012).
81. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1450; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1409(D) (2011).
82. MINN. STAT. § 209.09 (1990).
83. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-803(B) (2011) (requiring a bond with surety of $100 "per
precinct contained in whole or in part in the district being contested" for legislative elec-
tions to pay for the costs of the contest if the contesting party does not prevail); id. § 24.2-
804 (requiring a bond with surety of $10 per precinct in the state to contest elections for
governor, lieutenant governor, or attorney general).
84. See November 6, 2012 General Election Official Results, VA. STATE BD. OF
ELECTIONS, https://www.voterinfo.sbe.virginia.gov/election/DATA/2012/68C30477-AAF2-
46DD-994E-5D3BE 8A89C9B/Official6_s.shtml (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
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regarding the state's presidential electors.s5 Alabama also comes
closer to a standard that could actually deter some election con-
tests, particularly for lower profile, less costly races, by requiring
anyone contesting the election to file a bond in the amount of
$5,000 to cover the costs that will accrue in the proceeding.86 The
challenger forfeits the bond only if the initial election result
stands." Oklahoma also sets the bond requirement higher, but
only for election contests alleging fraud; in that instance the con-
testing party must post a cash bond of $5,000 for each county in
which the fraud allegedly occurred.8
Accordingly, more states could adopt Virginia's, Alabama's, or
Oklahoma's method and impose a fairly high bond requirement or
monetary sanction on losing candidates who wish to contest an
election. Finding $25,000 or another high amount, after a drawn
out and close campaign, presents at least a modest hurdle on con-
tinuing the fight. Furthermore, a losing candidate who is unsuc-
cessful in an election contest should have to pay the other side's
attorney's fees, even if it is more than the initial bond. Securing
this amount is not impossible, and the candidate's wealthy sup-
porters or the political party will likely foot the bill. If the state
crafts its rule as a bond requirement, then the initial outlay of
money is not too high, and it at least imposes some additional
barrier to entry by requiring the candidate and his or her sup-
porters to think twice before filing the challenge. The candidate
must consider whether the chance of success in the courts is
worth $25,000, or whatever other high number a state chooses to
impose, plus the shifting of attorneys' fees and costs.
Only a handful of states pose any barrier at the courthouse
door to contest an election, either at the front end through a filing
fee or the back end through forfeiting a bond or imposing a mone-
tary fine. At a minimum, states should follow the lead of other
states that require at least the posting of a bond to cover the
state's and other sides' costs and attorney's fees in the event that
the contest fails.
85. See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-805 (setting out procedures for contesting an election for
presidential electors).
86. See ALA. CODE. § 17-16-63 (2006).
87. See id.
88. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 8-119 (1977).
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C. Penalties on Future Candidacies
Perhaps a monetary sanction or hurdle is not enough to actual-
ly deter election contests, especially because wealthy candidates
or political parties will pay the fee or post the bond without prob-
lem. A fee-based deterrent also could fall disproportionately and
unfairly on less wealthy individuals. A harsher, yet non-
monetary, penalty for an unsuccessful challenge may be neces-
sary.
One idea is to create a public stigma against those candidates
who unsuccessfully challenge the election results. For example,
states could deem a previous candidate who lost an election con-
test ineligible for the ballot in a subsequent election. That is, the
state could limit ballot access for previous "sore loser" candidates.
Presumably, many candidates plan to run again, so they might
think twice before contesting the current election for fear of jeop-
ardizing future electoral prospects. Indeed, Richard Nixon chose
not to contest the close 1960 presidential election likely because
he planned to run for president again in the future."
A similar but milder approach is to provide these candidates
unfavorable ballot placement (such as at the bottom of the list of
candidates) in a subsequent election. Alternatively, much like we
force candidates to "approve this message" for political adver-
tisements, we could also require candidates to say that they "un-
successfully challenged the results in a previous election" in any
political ad.
These proposals might raise constitutional concerns, but there
are good arguments for why courts could sustain them. Limiting
eligibility for office or ballot access to certain candidates because
of their previous contestation of an election is obviously quite
harsh and potentially infringes the rights of those voters who
would otherwise support the candidate. 0 As the Supreme Court
has explained, "the rights of voters and the rights of candidates
do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candi-
dates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on
89. See Foley, supra note 32, at 61.
90. Cf. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 792-94 (1983) (explaining that a law
that unfairly limits ballot access for independent candidates infringes the rights of inde-
pendent-minded voters).
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voters."9 But states impose various eligibility requirements on
candidates to serve legitimate state interests. Some states require
candidates to reside in the electoral district for a certain amount
of time, which presumably helps to ensure that candidates under-
stand local concerns." Other candidates are ineligible if they have
served the maximum number of allowable terms, 3 which fosters
the state's goals of increasing the number of people involved in a
state's representative democracy.94 Almost all states prohibit a
''sore loser' candidate who lost in a party primary to appear on
the general election ballot as the nominee of a different political
party so as to protect the election process."
Similarly, a state would have a sufficiently important interest
in prohibiting a previous general election "sore loser" candidate
from running again. A state could conclude that one aspect of
serving in a representative capacity is an acquiescence to the cer-
tified election result. A candidate who unsuccessfully challenged
a previous election fails to prove a willingness to honor the result,
thwarting the state's goal of having certainty and finality in its
elections. That is, a state legitimately can seek representatives
who will accept certified election results as a virtue of protecting
the election process.
A milder ballot access regulation would be to relegate candi-
dates who challenged a previous election to a disfavored ballot
spot, such as last on the list of candidates for that office. Ballot
order matters: research demonstrates that candidates listed at
the top of the ballot often receive more votes than they might oth-
erwise if they were listed lower.96 Many states have recognized
91. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972).
92. See, e.g., N.J. CONST. Art. 4, § 1, 2 (providing that members of the Senate must
have been a citizen and resident of the state for at least four years and of the district for at
least one year preceding the election). A recent high-profile dispute concerned whether a
candidate, Rahm Emanuel, satisfied the residency requirements for the Chicago mayoral
election. See Maksym v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 950 N.E.2d 1051 (Ill. 2011).
93. For example, several state legislatures impose term limits on their members. See
The Term Limited States, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.
ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/legisdata/chart-of-term-limits-states.aspx (last visited Feb.
18, 2013) (current through Jan. 2013)
94. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 837 (1995) (noting that
term limits might "provide for the infusion of fresh ideas and new perspectives, and may
decrease the likelihood that representatives will lose touch with their constituents").
95. See Michael S. Kang, Sore Loser Laws and Democratic Contestation, 99 GEO. L.J.
1013, 1042 (2011).
96. See R. Michael Alvarez et al., How Much Is Enough? The "Ballot Order Effect" and
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the significance of the "ballot order effect" by requiring randomi-
zation of candidates' names on the ballot and rotation of the order
among precincts. Other states explicitly give ballot order prefer-
ence to incumbents or to the major political party who received
the highest number of votes in the previous election, placing that
party's nominee first.9" Candidates care about trying to be listed
first on the ballot.99
A state could use the ballot order effect as a disincentive to
election challenges: a candidate who chooses to contest an elec-
tion and loses suffers the disadvantage of poor ballot placement
in the next election, thus providing a deterrent to election con-
tests that are unlikely to succeed.
Courts have generally rejected constitutional challenges to
preferential ballot order. °° For example, a New Jersey court
turned away a minor political party's objection to the placement
of the major parties' nominees at the top of the ballot, stating that
there was no constitutional right to "an equal opportunity for
candidates for office to obtain the votes of those citizens who
would cast those votes in an unconscious manner."'' But we could
turn this proposition on its head: if states are allowed to favor the
major political parties or incumbents in ballot placement, it fol-
lows that states also could disfavor certain candidates for legiti-
mate means-such as to discourage election contests in previous
elections. The actual effects might be small; research differs on
the Use of Social Science Research in Election Law Disputes, 5 ELECTION L.J. 40, 41-43
(2006).
97. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 13112 (West 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.03
(West 2012).
98. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 3-11-2-6 (2012) (providing that the nominee of the party who
received the most votes in the county for secretary of state in the last election must appear
in the first column or row on the left side of all ballots). For a discussion of the ballot order
practices in all fifty states, see Laura Miller, Note, Election By Lottery: Ballot Order,
Equal Protection, and the Irrational Voter, 13 N.Y.U. J. LECIS. & PUB. POL'Y 373, 380-82
(2010).
99. See, e.g., Abdon M. Pallasch & Steve Patterson, Obama, Clinton Try for Top Spot
on State Ballot, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 30, 2007, at 15 (noting that both the Hillary Clinton
and Barack Obama campaigns camped out at county clerk offices to file first and therefore
be eligible for the lottery to determine the top placement on the primary election ballot).
100. See Miller, supra note 98, at 390 ("State and federal courts have been dealing with
challenges to ballot positioning for several decades, but relatively few courts have invali-
dated state statutes relating to ballot order.").
101. New Jersey Conservative Party v. Farmer, 753 A.2d 192, 200 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1999).
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the significance of the ballot order phenomenon.112 But a candi-
date who has further political aspirations will think carefully
about the potential negative effects in a subsequent election be-
fore contesting a current election's results. Even if the ballot or-
der effect is small as an empirical matter, a politician will not
want to take the risk unless there is a really good chance of win-
ning the current election contest.
Finally, states might require candidates who unsuccessfully
contested a previous election to say so in a political advertisement
in a future campaign. Federal law already requires candidates to
state both their name and that they approve the advertisement.
103
The Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to this
provision, holding that the law "bears a sufficient relationship to
the important governmental interest of 'shed[ding] the light of
publicity' on campaign financing."'0 4 Similarly, a requirement that
candidates explicitly state that they contested a previous election
and lost might bear a sufficient relationship with a state's goal of
fostering certainty and finality in its election, shedding publicity
on the manner in which the candidate interacted with the state's
election process.
To be sure, all three proposals approach the line of constitu-
tionality quite closely. A law that prohibits ballot access for a
candidate based on the candidate's conduct in a previous election
might violate that candidate's First Amendment rights and in-
fringe on the rights of voters to cast a meaningful vote for that
person. A law that explicitly disfavors certain candidates in ballot
order could raise equal protection concerns because the state is
favoring some candidates over others. And a court might view a
law that compels a candidate's speech about the candidate's pre-
vious activities in contesting an election as not being sufficiently
related to the state's goals of discouraging unmeritorious election
contests. But whether any of these proposals are constitutional is
a close case, and a state that wants to be aggressive in deterring
102. See Alvarez, supra note 96, at 43; Miller, supra note 98, at 388 ("In sum, ballot
order matters. The effect is likely relatively small for major party candidates in general
elections, but the effect is substantial for minor party candidates in the same races. In
primary and non-partisan elections, the effect is larger both in magnitude and statistical
significance for all types of candidates.").
103. 2 U.S.C. § 441d (2006).
104. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 231 (2003) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 81 (1976)).
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election contests might try them, even if that might invite litiga-
tion on their constitutionality. The ideas at least provide an ave-
nue for achieving a more vigorous deterrent to post-election liti-
gation. However, one flaw is that none of these methods are
effective if the candidate has no intention of running for any office
again.
This section was necessarily provocative, and the suggestions
are certainly harsh on candidates who unsuccessfully challenge
an election's result. Post-election litigation, however, should be
rare as compared to the likelihood of success, not frequent. Elimi-
nating all post-election litigation is perhaps not the best strategy
because something can always go awry in the election process,
and we need a safety valve to deal with that scenario. But there
ought to be some mechanism to dissuade losing candidates from
bringing the election to the courts except in limited situations.
Finality in the result is more important. I therefore raise these
ideas not to suggest that they are the best means of providing a
deterrent but to open the discussion of creative ways to achieve
finality after a state certifies a winner.
IV. CONCLUSION
Post-election disputes about the winner are sometimes neces-
sary when there are true questions about the validity of certain
ballots and the victor is unclear. Moreover, the main goal of elec-
tion administration should be to determine accurately who re-
ceived the most votes. But sometimes election contests are not
necessary, especially because they do not often change the result.
The several-month litigation in Minnesota confirming Al Franken
as the winner of the U.S. Senate election did not add much to the
election process; maybe Norm Coleman would have conceded ear-
lier had he faced more severe consequences for bringing the con-
test. Perhaps Joe Miller sees a future for himself in Alaska poli-
tics, and he might not have brought the 2010 Alaska U.S. Senate
race to the courts had he faced a penalty for initiating post-
election litigation. Election contests can undermine the goals of
finality, certainty, and legitimacy of the democratic process. The
system, particularly after Bush v. Gore signaled courts' open door
to election litigation, provides few disincentives to losing candi-
dates filing an election contest. One way to discourage post-
election litigation is to push litigants to resolve challenges before
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DISCOURAGING ELECTION CONTESTS
the election."5 But if it is a close race, many losing candidates will
not give up the fight.
Therefore, we need structural or procedural mechanisms that
discourage unmeritorious election contests. This essay is meant
to start a conversation of how best to place a reasonable deterrent
on post-election litigation. The goal is to make the candidate and
his or her supporters decide, ex ante, whether contesting the re-
sult and losing is worth the penalties a state would impose. The
ideas in this essay range from the most practical to the most con-
troversial. It does not seem unreasonable to require a high filing
fee or a bond and to shift costs to losing candidates who unsuc-
cessfully contest the result. Indeed, because several states al-
ready do so, forcing candidates to post a bond that will cover the
other sides' attorney's fees is probably the proposal that has the
most likely chance of adoption. Or maybe we need harsher conse-
quences on candidates themselves, especially if they plan to run
again. We could start by imposing these disincentives on federal
and statewide races, as these are the costliest, highest-profile
disputes, and-based on recent data-are the least likely to
change the outcome. Either way, the point is to think critically
about what we can do to limit courts or other tribunals from hav-
ing the final say in who won an election unless absolutely neces-
sary. We should discourage those election contests that, in the
losing candidate's calculation, either have little chance of success
or are not worth the strings the state attaches to its election con-
test provisions.
105. See Hasen, supra note 46, at 37.
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